Toplines:
Refineries are factories that turn crude oil into gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Recently, fighting around the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on Russian plants have taken millions of barrels a day of refining capacity offline, sending diesel to record highs and driving up the cost of gasoline.
Not every refinery can run every barrel. Light, sweet crude is more expensive to buy but cheaper to process, while heavy, sour crude is cheaper but more expensive to process. America’s Gulf Coast fleet was built for heavy sour imports during an era of declining domestic production, which is why the United States is now both a top crude producer and a major crude importer.
Refining is a margin business, and the metric to watch is the “crack spread”: the gap between the price of crude and the price of refined products. Refiners set neither price, as crude and refined products are both traded commodities. The US diesel crack normally runs $20 to $40 a barrel, but has been above $100 in recent weeks – a signal that the market is short on supply.
US refineries are running at 97 to 98 percent of capacity, versus about 90 in a normal year, so there is no slack left to add supply. With no large new refinery built since 1977 and domestic capacity more or less flat, relief will depend on Gulf plants returning, Russian refineries staying online, and a smooth US maintenance season. In the long run, the US will have to work to ensure its lost capacity is replaced.
This month, two supply shocks have collided to send diesel prices to the highest national average ever recorded, and gas prices back up to around $4.32, up more than a dollar from a year ago.
First, the renewed fighting in and around the Strait of Hormuz has sent crude prices back past $100, threatening to keep prices elevated well into next year. At the same time, petroleum product markets are facing a global refining shock due to disruptions in countries such as Russia and the Gulf states.1
Amidst this shortage, buyers are looking to US refineries for additional capacity. Yet US refineries are already running nearly full tilt, and the lack of slack in the system is pushing prices even further upward.
While the effect of oil prices on products like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel is reasonably well understood, the refining industry often gets less attention. But given refineries’ importance to fuel prices and inflation, understanding this segment of the oil supply chain is essential to understanding the trajectory of energy prices and the US economy as a whole.
What Are Refineries?
A refinery is a factory that takes crude oil and turns it into finished products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, as well as the feedstocks that become plastics and fertilizer.
In its raw form, crude is a mix of thousands of different hydrocarbon molecules, from gases to tars and beyond. The role of the refinery is to sort that mix by weight and develop usable products.
The sorting happens in a distillation tower, where crude is heated to around 700º F. The lightest molecules rise to the top, and are collected as refinery gases and naphtha, the raw material for gasoline. Heavier molecules condense lower down and turn into kerosene, which in turn becomes jet fuel, and gas oil, which becomes diesel. Molecules which are too heavy to boil pool at the bottom as residuum, which is essentially tar.
The next step for a refinery is conversion, whereby “crackers” use heat, pressure, and catalysts to convert the long molecules in gas oil into the shorter molecules that can be sold as gasoline and diesel. Meanwhile, “cokers” cook the residuum until it releases its remaining lighter fuel, reformers and alkylation units increase the octane of gasoline components, and hydrotreaters strip sulfur out of the intermediate streams so the finished fuel product meets federal standards. Finally, these streams are blended with additives into finished fuels.
Typical US refineries convert a 42-gallon barrel of crude into roughly 20 gallons of gasoline, 12 gallons of distillate (which includes diesel and heating oil), 4 gallons of jet fuel, and a remaining mix of asphalt, and other products. Counterintuitively, this results in more than 42 gallons of product, because most of the products are less dense than the crude they came from. This phenomenon is known as “processing gain” and generally sits at around 6 percent for US refineries.2
Heavy and Light, Sweet and Sour
Not all crude oil is the same. In particular, the properties of crude (density and sulfur content) vary dramatically depending on the geology of the basin from which it was produced, and determine which refineries can run a given barrel and what they’re willing to pay for it.
Light crude, which is less dense, has more of the valuable short-chain hydrocarbons to begin with, so refineries can produce more finished products with less processing. This results in light crude selling at a premium. Heavy crude, meanwhile, has more of the longer molecules that require more cracking and coking, and also typically brings more sulfur, metals, and other unwanted contaminants along with it.
For sulfur content, what matters is whether the crude is “sweet” or “sour”. Crude which has less than about half a percent sulfur by weight is sweet, while anything above that is sour. Remarkably, these terms are literal, emerging from nineteenth-century prospectors’ practice of tasting and smelling crude to judge its quality.
The important thing about sulfur is that it’s heavily regulated in the United States, as sulfur when burned becomes sulfur dioxide and interferes with pollution control equipment on cars and trucks. Inside the refinery, it also corrodes important equipment like pipes and vessels, so a refinery that runs sour crude needs more expensive metallurgy and more frequent maintenance. Removing the sulfur takes energy and capital, so sour crude sells at a discount compared to sweet.
Sweet crude tends to be light and sour crude tends to be heavy, but this is not a hard and fast rule – there is plenty of medium sour as well as some heavy sweet crude in the world.
The below table shows how a few of the major global benchmarks stack up across both measures.
Selected crude grades3
| Grade | Origin | Density (API gravity) | Sulfur |
|---|---|---|---|
| WTI | Texas | ~40° | 0.3% |
| Bakken | North Dakota | ~42° | 0.2% |
| Brent | North Sea (Europe) | ~38° | 0.4% |
| Arab Light | Saudi Arabia | ~33° | 1.8% |
| Urals | Russia | ~31° | 1.5% |
| Maya | Mexico | ~22° | 3.3% |
| Western Canadian Select | Alberta | ~21° | 3.5% |
| Merey | Venezuela | ~16° | 2.7% |
A simple refinery buys mostly light sweet crude and pays a premium for it. A complex refinery with the necessary cokers and hydrocrackers can run cheap heavy sour crude and turn it into the same end products. This gives complex refineries a cost advantage on the crude it purchases, though complex refineries are substantially more expensive to build and operate.
When America’s big Gulf Coast plants were built out in the 1990s and 2000s, US production was declining and light sweet crude was both scarce and expensive. As a result, U.S. refineries were designed to run heavy sour crude from abroad, namely Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada. But just a few years later the shale boom arrived, producing enormous volumes of light sweet crude domestically.
The result is that the United States is positioned to simultaneously be a top crude producer and a major exporter, all while importing several million barrels of heavier crude per day.4 Refiners have been progressively adjusting, and the average barrel entering US refineries has gotten lighter over time, but the fleet’s heavy crude architecture cannot be undone quickly or cheaply. Importantly, much of the crude stranded behind the Strait of Hormuz is medium and heavy grade, so the barrels best suited to America’s refineries have become more scarce in the near-term.
Refinery Economics, Briefly
The business of refining is all about margins. A refiner buys crude at one price, sells products at another, and keeps the difference. Refiners set neither price, as crude and refined products are both traded commodities. To be profitable, this difference must offset the high cost of running the refinery. While crude is priced on a global market, refined products are priced more regionally, so these margins can contract and expand for a number of different reasons.
This gap is known as the “crack spread”: the difference between the wholesale price of a refined product and the price of crude on a per-barrel basis. A crack spread can be calculated for a single product – the gasoline crack and the diesel crack are both commonly quoted – or for multiple products together. The most common multiple-product spread is the 3:2:1 crack spread, which assumes three barrels of raw crude are refined into two barrels of gasoline and one barrel of distillate (roughly the proportions US refineries actually produce).
A crack spread is not a perfect proxy for refiners’ profit margin, as it ignores every cost except crude. However, it does offer an indication of the conditions of a particular market. For example, a widening gasoline crack in the spring usually means refiners have been slow to build inventories ahead of the summer driving season. A collapsing diesel crack in the winter usually means industrial demand is low or there is an oversupply of distillate.
In a normal year the US diesel crack might run $20 to $40 a barrel. This year, on August 17 it went past $100 a barrel.5 The gasoline crack has been elevated but nowhere near that, which means that we’re facing more of a diesel shortage than a gasoline one. In these situations, refiners respond by tuning their operations to produce as much diesel as they can; every additional barrel they produce helps fill the gap and put downward pressure on prices.
In addition to the crack spread, the other key metric is the utilization rate, also known as the run rate. This is the share of the country’s refining capacity that is actually processing crude in a given week. Capacity itself can be measured in two ways. Calendar-day capacity estimates what a plant can process over a 24-hour period, allowing for scheduled and unscheduled downtime. Stream-day capacity represents the plant’s theoretical maximum with no downtime, and typically runs about 6 percent higher. Utilization rates are measured against calendar-day capacity, and are reported by the EIA weekly.6
In a typical year, US refineries have utilization rates around 90 percent on average – often higher in the summer and lower in the spring and fall when units go offline for maintenance. Right now they are running much higher to meet global demand and respond to capacity knocked offline in the Middle East and Russia – currently at around 97 to 98 percent of capacity.7
In other words, US refineries are running at full capacity. There is no more diesel to be squeezed out of the American fleet, or capacity to refine any increases in domestic production, and this is why prices are where they are.
Refining in America
In 1982, the first year for which EIA has data, there were more than 300 operable refineries in the United States, with a combined capacity of 17.9 million barrels per day.8 Many were tiny “tea kettle” refineries that had sprung up to collect price-control-era subsidies.9 When President Reagan ended the price controls and associated subsidies in 1981, the tea kettles began closing almost at once. Over the next dozen years the number of refineries fell by 40 percent, and capacity bottomed out at 15.0 million barrels per day in 1994.
No company has built a large new refinery in the United States since Marathon’s Garyville plant opened in 1977.10 And yet, between 1994 and 2020, US capacity grew by nearly 4 million barrels per day. This growth came thanks to expansions of existing sites as refiners added units and in some cases doubled or tripled the size of old plants. The average US refinery processed about 60,000 barrels a day in 1982; today the average is about 140,000.
During this period of capacity expansion, the United States’ Gulf Coast refinery fleet became the most sophisticated in the world, as refiners poured money into cokers and hydrocrackers to run cheap heavy sour crude. Today, more than half of US refining capacity sits on the Gulf Coast, between Corpus Christi, Texas and New Orleans, Louisiana.
The last several years have seen declines in American refining capacity. The COVID era demand collapse, combined with damage-related shutdowns, resulted in a loss of more than a million barrels per day.11 Capacity bounced back somewhat with the expansion of ExxonMobil’s Beaumont refinery in 2023, but was followed by the closure of several more refineries: LyondellBasell’s Houston facility, Phillips 66’s Los Angeles facility, and Valero’s facility in the Bay Area. As of January 1 of this year, the United States had 130 refineries and 18.2 million barrels per day of capacity, about 4 percent below the 2020 peak.12
America and the World Today
In a normal year, America’s refineries handle roughly one fifth of the 85 million or so barrels of crude that the world’s refineries process each day. Roughly 60 percent of these barrels are produced domestically, while the rest are typically heavier grades imported from Canada, Mexico, and South America.13 Our refineries are, on average, more complex than any other nation’s, and have a substantially higher utilization rate – at 90-plus, compared to the low 80s global average.
Over the last couple of decades, global refining has had a shrinking margin for error. Europe has been closing refineries as its fuel demand has shrunk. The COVID years permanently took out more than 3 million barrels a day of capacity globally. And while some new capacity has come online since, much of the Middle Eastern additions were designed to ship their output through the now-embattled Strait of Hormuz. Gulf producers exported 3.3 million barrels a day of refined products in 2025.14
When the Strait effectively closed at the end of February, more than 3 million barrels a day of the region’s refining capacity were shut due to either attacks or a lack of outlet. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries and export terminals have knocked out a significant share of Russian refining capacity, while China has restricted product exports to protect its own market.15 Altogether, this has caused global refinery runs in July to drop nearly 5 million barrels a day below where they were a year ago.16
The result is that, even during periods when crude prices have fallen, product prices have remained high. The crude that has started flowing needs to go somewhere to be turned into fuel and other products, but many of those places are damaged, blockaded, or under attack.
Global and Domestic Prices
Diesel and gasoline are internationally traded, and the Gulf Coast is the key supplier for the entire Atlantic region. As a result, US prices are tied to that wider market: when diesel is scarce internationally, domestic prices rise regardless of how hard American refineries run.
Diesel is also seasonal, making this fall particularly expensive. Distillate production normally dips during the autumn maintenance season while demand picks up for the fall agricultural harvest, and the Northeast starts buying heating oil. EIA expects the US diesel crack to stay above $2 a gallon, or more than $80 a barrel, through November before easing into next year.17
Two other features of the US system have made it exposed. First, geography: the East Coast has very little of its own refining capacity, relying on the Gulf Coast and Europe at a time when Europe is running short. The West Coast is also a fuel island: no pipelines connect it to the Gulf Coast, domestic shipping is prohibitively expensive due to the Jones Act, and its own refinery base is quickly shrinking. Second, at a 97 percent utilization rate, US refineries do not have room to add supply. Every unplanned outage from here on out will therefore be a straight subtraction from the market.
What To Watch
Three things will determine whether the refining squeeze improves over the next year and beyond. First, whether the Gulf export refineries come back, which will depend on safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and repairs to existing damages. Second, whether Ukraine keeps hitting Russian refineries – as long as it does, Russia’s share of the world’s diesel will stay offline. Third, whether the fall maintenance season goes smoothly in the US, as refiners have deferred maintenance to catch this year’s margins, increasing the likelihood of major unplanned outages. Then, in the long run, the question will be whether the capacity we’ve lost in recent years will get replaced by increasing imports or new domestic capacity at home.
International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report – August 2026. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Refining Crude Oil – Inputs and Outputs. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Crude Oils Have Different Quality Characteristics, July 16, 2012; U.S. Energy Information Administration, Venezuela. Assay figures are rounded and vary by cargo. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, The United States Produces Lighter Crude Oil, Imports Heavier Crude Oil, 2022. ↩
DieselNet, US Diesel Crack Spread Surpasses $100 a Barrel for the First Time, August 19, 2026. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Refining Capacity Decreased During 2025, June 2026. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly U.S. Percent Utilization of Refinery Operable Capacity. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Number of Operable Refineries as of January 1 and U.S. Refinery Operable Atmospheric Crude Oil Distillation Capacity as of January 1. ↩
Econlib, Planned Chaos: U.S. Petroleum Policy Remembered, November 1, 2023; Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Executive Order 12287 – Decontrol of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products, January 28, 1981. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, When Was the Last Refinery Built in the United States?. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Refinery Operable Atmospheric Crude Oil Distillation Capacity as of January 1. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Refining Capacity Decreased During 2025, June 2026. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Oil and Petroleum Products Explained: Oil Imports and Exports; Weekly Petroleum Status Report. ↩
International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report – March 2026. ↩
International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report – May 2026; American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, What They’re Saying: Fuel Prices and High Earnings Result from Stress in Global Refining, August 2026. ↩
International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report – August 2026. ↩
U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook: Petroleum Products, September 2026. ↩